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COMMENTS
Drug Trafficking at Airports - The Judicial
Response
KATHLEEN MAHONEY*
The magnitude of the illegal drug trafficking problem fac-
ing the United States today has caused the state and federal
governments to step up their efforts to curb narcotics dealing
and distribution. Focusing on governmental attempts to appre-
hend drug couriers at national airports, this article examines
the judicial response to the fourth amendment issues raised by
searches and seizures of suspected couriers. The author sug-
gests that the seriousness of the drug trafficking problem has
led some courts to bend traditional fourth amendment
principles.
Traffic in illegal drugs has become a troublesome national
problem' that has reached crisis proportions in South Florida.2
Preventing the distribution of drugs within the United States and
apprehending drug dealers have thus become major objectives of
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
Because most illegal drug traffic originates outside the United
States, major narcotics dealers and local wholesalers employ drug
couriers or "mules" to import and distribute the drugs. These cou-
riers usually use the fastest available means of transportation-the
* Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our population, particularly
our young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled sub-
stances. Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophisti-
cated criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many drugs, including
heroin, may be easily concealed. As a result, the obstacles to detection of illegal
conduct may be unmatched in any other area of law enforcement.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
2. "South Florida is being inundated with a multi-million dollar narcotic drug traffic
derived in large part from sources outside the country. That traffic by any standard is cor-
rupting this society and simultaneously bringing with it an unprecedented degree of violence
and murder .... " Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015, 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehear-
ing en banc) (Hubbart, J., concurring), review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 631 (1981).
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commercial airlines. In an attempt to stem the illegal drug traffic,
state and federal governments have established airport surveillance
teams to identify and apprehend drug couriers. In a typical case, a
plainclothes officer stationed at an airport will spot a person dis-
playing the characteristics of a drug courier. The agent will ap-
proach the suspect and request identification, and then compare
the identification with the suspect's airline ticket to ascertain
whether he is using an alias. Frequently, the agent will also request
the suspect's permission to search his luggage. This article will ex-
amine the constitutionality of this police-citizen encounter.3
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution gov-
erns searches of luggage and seizures of individuals by government
agents. The amendment provides in part: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ."
Searches and seizures of drug couriers at airports raise four impor-
tant fourth amendment issues that this comment will address:
First, does an encounter between a suspected drug courier and
a government agent constitute a fourth amendment seizure of the
suspect?
Second, if the suspect is seized, can the seizure be justified by
the constitutional standard of probable cause or articulable
suspicion?
Third, if the suspect consents to a search, is that consent
voluntary?
Fourth, if the suspect is illegally seized, but voluntarily con-
sents to a luggage search, is the contraband seized nevertheless
"fruit of the poisonous tree" that must be excluded at trial?
1. Does an encounter between a suspected drug courier and a
government agent constitute a fourth amendment seizure of the
3. This article will not discuss the government's efforts to protect the public from air
piracy through the use of hijacker profiles, magnetometers, or the limited searches of per-
sons and their carry-on baggage before boarding an airplane. Such "airport security mea-
sures .. .instituted to detect a prospective hijacker, are reasonable and constitutionally
justified as a limited and relatively insignificant intrusion of privacy viewed against the
grave necessity to protect an aircraft and its passengers and crew." Shapiro v. State, 390 So.
2d 344, 349 (Fla. 1980); see United States v. Clay, 638 F.2d 889 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 917 (1981); United States v. Gorman, 637 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); Pyszka v. State, 400 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Oishi v.
State, 400 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).




Litigation involving seizures of drug couriers at airports is a
recent phenomenon; the first federal appellate decision was re-
ported in 1977.1 In addressing the constitutional issues presented
by these confrontations, therefore, many federal and state courts,
including the Supreme Court of the United States, have applied
the traditional fourth amendment analysis used in cases involving
seizures of pedestrians and motor vehicles. a
Historically, courts equated the "seizures" contemplated by
the fourth amendment with "arrests. '7 An individual was seized
when he was subject to the custodial restraint of arrest or station-
house booking. Since 1968, however, Supreme Court decisions have
expanded the concept of seizure to include not only technical ar-
rests, but also less intrusive investigatory detentions or "stops.' 8
As the Court stated in Davis v. Mississippi,9 "[nIothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry,
whether these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory
detentions.' "10
Although lower courts have found that a "mere contact" be-
tween a government agent and a private citizen is not necessarily a
"seizure,"' 1 the Supreme Court has never recognized a distinction
between an "investigatory detention" or "stop" amounting to a
fourth amendment seizure, and a "mere contact." In defining the
concept of seizure, the Court has held that "whenever a police of-
ficer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away,
he has 'seized' that person." 2 Further, "even though the purpose
of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief,"'"
there has been a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment." On the other hand, the Court held in Terry v. Ohio'5 that
5. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977).
6. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873 (1975), discussed in Kadish &
Brofman, Drug Courier Characteristics: A Defense Profile, TRIAL, May 1979, at 47, 49.
7. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
8. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
10. Id. at 726-27 (footnote omitted).
11. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d.62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (police department regula-
tions distinguished "contacts" from "investigative 'stops' "), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944
(1978).
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
13. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
14. Even if the officer's purpose is merely to ask the suspect for identification, the stop
is a seizure. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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"[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure'
has occurred." 16 It is from this language in Terry that the "mere
contact" argument is derived.
17
Many federal courts of appeals have applied these standards
to airport encounters and found that a fourth amendment seizure
occurs either when the government agent initially approaches the
individual, identifies himself, and asks for the suspect's identifica-
tion and airline ticket, 18 or when the agent subsequently begins to
question the suspect.' 9 Other federal courts of appeals have con-
cluded that a seizure occurs when a government agent questions an
individual after telling the individual he is suspected of carrying
narcotics." In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the rule seems to be that an initial police-citizen encoun-
ter, which includes limited questioning and the production of iden-
tification and an airline ticket, is "merely a police-citizen contact"
that does not constitute a fourth amendment seizure.2 A seizure
does occur, however, when an officer takes and retains the sus-
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
16. Id. at 19 n.16.
17. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
944 (1978).
18. Accord United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980) (suspect seized when
detective held out credentials and blocked suspect's path); see United States v. Vasquez,
612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Vasquez-
Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); United States v.
Andrews, 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979); United States v. Rico,
594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d
717 (6th Cir. 1977). But see United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1042 (5th Cir. 1979)
(suspect seized when officer retained suspect's airline ticket), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1980).
19. Cf. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977) (investigatory stop occurred
when agents asked suspect to accompany them to airport office for questioning). If an agent
did not have an opportunity to ask questions because the suspect fled immediately after the
agent approached and identified himself, the initial encounter was not a stop. United States
v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977).
20. United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1980) (remanded for
determination of whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave after being accused of
carrying narcotics); see United States v. Martell,. 654 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Canales, 572 F.2d 1182 (6th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011
(1978); United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1977).
21. United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1079 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 649 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pulvano, 625 F.2d 1151, 1155 (5th Cir. 1980).
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pect's identification or ticket.2 If the officer takes the suspect to
an office in the terminal for questioning, the Fifth Circuit agrees
with the Second and Sixth Circuits that this, too, represents a
fourth amendment seizure. 3
The Florida appellate courts did not decide any drug courier
cases until 1979.24 Since then, many district courts of appeal have
either evaded the issue or assumed that a seizure occurs as soon as
an officer approaches a suspect, asks for his identification and air-
line ticket, and begins to question him.2 5 Other courts have ad-
dressed the issue directly and found that a seizure occurs when the
officer retains the suspect's identification and ticket. At this point,
the courts have concluded that the individual was not reasonably
free to leave.26 If an officer merely approaches a suspect, requests
identification and an airline ticket, and asks if he can speak to the
suspect, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has specifi-
cally held that only a "pre-detention encounter" occurs.2 7 Such an
encounter does not constitute a fourth amendment seizure until
the officer actually retains the ticket and identification.2 8
Because of the varied and inconsistent opinions, the litigation
involving seizures of suspected drug couriers finally reached the
Supreme Court in 1980, in the cases of United States v. Menden-
hall29 and Reid v. Georgia.30 The specific issue of seizure, however,
22. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910
(1980); accord United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. See United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Pulvano, 625 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980); United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
878 (1979); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith,
574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Hunter, 550 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1977).
24. State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
25. See State v. Henry, 390 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Robinson v. State, 388 So. 2d
286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State v. Champion, 383 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v.
Mitchell, 377 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Husted v. State, 370 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA
1979). But see State v. Grant, 392 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
26. E.g., State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); accord Royer v. State, 389
So. 2d 1007, 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehearing en banc) (not only had suspect's ticket and
luggage been retained, but suspect had been accused of carrying narcotics and confined in
small airport interrogation room), review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 631 (1981).
27. Login v. State, 394 So. 2d 183, 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
28. Id.
29. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
30. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
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remains unresolved, underscoring its conceptual difficulty.
The facts of Mendenhall are typical of many drug courier
stops at airports. Two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents ob-
served Ms. Mendenhall when she arrived in Detroit on a flight
from Los Angeles. Because her conduct was purportedly similar to
that of drug couriers, the agents approached her, identified them-
selves, and asked to see her identification and airline ticket. After
limited questioning, the agents returned Mendenhall's ticket and
driver's license. 1
Neither the trial court nor the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether the agents had seized Mendenhall. Apparently,
the litigants and lower courts assumed that a seizure had oc-
curred.82 Nonetheless, Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality,
believed that "exceptional circumstances" justified considering this
issue even though it had not been raised below, 3 and proceeded to
hold that no seizure had occurred.8" In a separate opinion, Justice
Powell found that the question whether a seizure had taken place
was "extremely close," 8 but decided to assume for the purposes of
his opinion that the agents had seized Mendenhall." The four dis-
senting Justices also believed that a seizure had occurred, but dis-
agreed with the plurality's use of objective factors." The dissent
suggested that the case should have been remanded for a determi-
nation of the seizure issue after an evidentiary hearing. Given the
sharp division of the Supreme Court, the precedential value of
Mendenhall on this issue is questionable.3 9
In the second drug courier case presented to the Supreme
Court, Reid v. Georgia,'40 the lower courts and litigants again as-
31. 446 U.S. at 547-48.
32. Id. at 551 n.5.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 555.
35. Id. at 560 n.1 (concurring opinion).
36. Id. at 560.
37. Id. at 569-70 & nn.3-4 (White, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 571.
39. See United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1078 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he plurality opinion
of the Supreme Court in Mendenhall is not binding precedent on this court concerning the
'seizure' issue. . . ."), reh'g granted, 649 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1154 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211,
1214-15 (5th Cir. 1980).
For perceptive analyses of the Mendenhall decision and its precedential value, see
Greenberg, Drug Courier Profiles, Mendenhall and Reid: Analyzing Police Intrusions on
Less Than Probable Cause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 49 (1981), and Case Comment, Criminal
Law: Drug Courier Profiles, United States v. Mendenhall, 5 NOVA L.J. 141 (1980).
40. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
[Vol. 36:91
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sumed that the defendant had been seized. In Reid, the defendant
and a companion arrived in Atlanta on a flight from Fort Lauder-
dale. Because their behavior was consistent with that of drug cou-
riers, a DEA agent approached them outside the terminal. The
agent identified himself and asked for their identification and tick-
et stubs.4 1 The litigants did not raise the seizure issue before the
Supreme Court. Unlike the splintered Mendenhall opinion, eight
of the nine Justices assumed in Reid that the initial encounter was
a seizure. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, noted that
the state courts had decided Reid before the-Supreme Court ad-
dressed the seizure issue in MendenhaU1.4" Since the Reid decision
did not address the initial seizure issue, the question "remains
open for consideration by the state courts in light of the opinions
in Mendenhall.""
Despite the questionable efficacy of the Mendenhall opinion,
it does posit a test for determining the existence of a seizure, re-
gard-less of whether a police-citizen encounter occurs at the airport
or on the street. The Mendenhall Court held that "a person has
been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding 'the incident, a rea-
sonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."
' 5
This test seemingly would be adequate, were it not for its
questionable application by Justice Stewart. Under his "reasonable
person" test, a seizure might consist of "the threatening presence
of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some
physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of lan-
guage or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled. ' '1" This approach is too restrictive, for
it ignores the social pressures inherent in most police-citizen en-
counters. 7 It also fails to recognize that the fourth amendment
governs situations in which there is no evidence of intimidation.
Regarding an encounter between a government agent and a citizen
at an airport, one court stated:
41. Id. at 439.
42. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 442.
43. Id. at 443.
44. Id.
45. 446 U.S. at 554 (footnote omitted).
46. Id.
47. See United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 466 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 2325 (1981).
48. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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True, defendant could have ignored the agent and refused to
converse with him, but such conduct on [his] part would have
been, at the very least, a breach of etiquette, an act of discour-
tesy and incivility which would not be expected of the ordinary,
reasonable person innocent of crime. In the opinion of this
Court, when an officer, upon a show of authority accosts a sus-
pect and takes advantage of social pressures which inhibit the
suspect from declining to deal with him, he restrains the sus-
pect's liberty to the extent required to constitute a Terry stop."'
The "reasonable person" test cannot adequately safeguard fourth
amendment rights if courts do not consider these social pressures.
In deciding seizure issues, courts should also consider the of-
ficer's motive for initiating the encounter. The Supreme Court of
Florida suggested this approach in Mullins v. State.50 Justice Al-
derman discussed motive in distinguishing between seizures and
mere contacts:
I recognize, however, that instances will arise where there will be
legitimate contact between a police officer and a citizen, not
based upon "founded suspicion" or "probable cause," which
may result in the subsequent arrest of the citizen for a crime
detected by the police officer as a result of the legitimate con-
tact. For example, a police officer in the performance of his duty
may stop to assist a motorist who has a flat tire or may stop a
woman bicyclist at night to warn her of the presence of a rapist
in the area. If during these legitimate encounters with the mo-
torist or the woman, the police officer observes stolen stereo
equipment in the motorist's automobile or smells the odor of
marijuana emanating from the woman and sees a plastic bag
containing what appears to be marijuana protruding from her
pocket, he may lawfully seize the evidence.
• . . The difference between these examples and the present
case is that the police officer in this case was not attempting to
assist the defendant in any way but had stopped him on a bare
suspicion that he was violating the law."
Thus, courts can examine a police officer's motives to distinguish a
neutral or positive encounter from one instigated by an officer who
suspects criminal activity.
If this approach were applied to seizures at airports, an indi-
49. United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433, 439 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (footnote omit-
ted), quoted in State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593, 597 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
50. 366 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
51. Id. at 1163 (concurring opinion).
[Vol. 36:91
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vidual stopped or detained by a government agent who suspected
him of carrying narcotics would be entitled to constitutional safe-
guards because the stop would fall within the purview of the fourth
amendment.2 If, on the other hand, an individual asked an officer
for directions, or an officer merely attempted to aid someone obvi-
ously in distress, the encounter would not implicate fourth amend-
ment rights because the officer's motivation was neutral or posi-
tive. Arresting officers, unlike defendants, ordinarily are required
to testify at suppression hearings. Consequently, the officer's rea-
sons for initiating the contact usually will be comparatively easy to
ascertain. The customary reticence of defendants at these hearings
renders application of the Mendenhall "reasonable person" test
problematical, however, because conclusions about the defendant's
perceptions of the stop must be inferred from other evidence.
2. If the suspect is seized, can the seizure be justified by the
constitutional standard of probable cause or articulable
suspicion?
The fourth amendment protects persons from unreasonable
seizures.5 3 When a government agent stops a suspected drug cou-
rier at an airport because the suspect fits the drug courier profile,
it must be determined whether the seizure was "reasonable." The
seizure is reasonable only if it is supported by probable cause or
"specific and articulable facts which . . . reasonably warrant that
intrusion.""6
The drug courier profile is a list of characteristics that the
DEA believes are common to drug couriers.5 5 Initially developed in
1974 by DEA agents at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the pro-
file is now used by agents at other airports, including Miami's. 6
The narcotics detail at each airport occasionally supplements the
general list of characteristics with its own successful observations.
Because the profile differs to some extent from airport to airport,
it has been characterized as "loosely formulated.
'57
52. That is, the officer must have probable cause or a reasonable, articulable suspicion.
See infra text accompanying notes 53-89.
53. See supra text accompanying note 4.
54. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
55. United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979).
56. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 39, at 52 n.24.
57. United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pope,
561 F.2d 663, 666 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719 (6th Cir.
1977).
For a general history and description of the drug courier profile, see United States v.
19811
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Although law enforcement officers have been trained to use
the profile, the list of characteristics is informal and unwritten. 8
During the course of litigation, however, many of the characteris-
tics have been revealed. The primary characteristics are: (1) travel
to-and from major drug "source cities" such as New York, Los An-
geles, Miami, and Fort Lauderdale; (2) a short visit; (3) use of an
alias; (4) absence of luggage other than carry-on bags, especially
for long-distance trips that normally would require extra clothing;
(5) the purchase of airline tickets with cash in small denomina-
tions; (6) unusual nervousness, including the appearance of looking
around for law enforcement officers; and (7) carrying large
amounts of cash.5 9 This list is by no means exhaustive. Indeed, the
profile frequently seems to change to fit the facts of each case." At
a suppression hearing in 1977, a DEA agent candidly "testified
that the profile in a particular case consists of anything that
arouses his suspicions.""e
Use of the drug courier profile is not complex. It simply "in-
volves visual observation and investigation of a particular individ-
ual and developing a sensitivity to a number of details that either
increase or decrease the likelihood that a person is a courier.""
Law enforcement officers monitor flights from source cities and fo-
cus on anyone who matches any of the profile characteristics. If
further observation confirms the agent's initial suspicion, the agent
Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); Kadish & Brofman, supra note 6.
58. United States v. Price, 599 F.2d at 502 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Lewis,
556 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Mc-
Caleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977).
59. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 910 (1980); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 666 n.3 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th
Cir. 1977); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); Kadish & Brofman, supra note 6, at 48.
Secondary characteristics used in Atlanta, for example, are
(1) making a telephone call immediately after arrival; (2) use of a taxicab to
leave the airport rather than being met by family or friends or using public
transportation; (3) association with a known narcotics dealer; (4) a false tele-
phone number given to the airline reservations service; (5) traveling companions
who attempt to conceal their association; and (6) the switching of baggage check
claim stubs with other individuals.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Thomas, No. CR 78-223A (N.D. Ga. 1978)).
60. United States v. WesterbannMartinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
61. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
62. United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 538 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978).
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must then decide whether to stop the suspect before he leaves the
airport."
Stopping suspects is reasonable only if officers possess either
"probable cause" or an "articulable and reasonable suspicion. '"64
Probable cause exists if "the facts and circumstances within [the
officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [individual] had committed or was committing an of-
fense. '6 5 Probable cause justifies an arrest as well as a search of the
suspect and, arguably, his carry-on luggage. 66
In the early drug courier profile cases, the government argued
that ,n individual's conformance to the profile would give a nar-
cotics agent the probable cause needed to effect an arrest. Federal
and Florida courts generally have rejected this argument because
usually "there is no direct evidence that crime has been committed
... .In short, the 'smoking gun' is lacking."
67
Critics have faulted the absence of guidelines regarding the
number of characteristics a suspect must manifest before an officer
can justifiably stop him." Whether an individual "fits the profile"
is, therefore, left to the subjective judgment of the officer. In addi-
tion, critics distrust the profile because too many of the "suspi-
cious" characteristics are "consistent with complete innocence." 69
"[T]he profile is too amorphous to be integrated into a legal stan-
63. Id.
64. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
65. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); accord Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,
208 n.9 (1979); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
66. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
67. United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 543 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d
385 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); see United States v. Place, 660 F.2d
44, 49 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 915 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 385, 389
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594,
596 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977); Royer v.
State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015, 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehearing en banc), review denied,
397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1981); State v. Mitchell, 377 So. 2d 1006,
1008 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978) (four characteristics
insufficient to justify stop); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978) (two char-
acteristics insufficient); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977) (four character-
istics insufficient, stop upheld for other reasons); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717
(6th Cir. 1977) (four characteristics insufficient).
69. Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015-16 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehearing en banc),
review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1981); accord United
States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151, 1155 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Andrews, 600
F.2d 563, 566 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979).
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dard"; 70 it cannot effectively govern official conduct.
Failing to persuade the courts that conformance to the profile
establishes the requisite probable cause to justify an arrest, the
government has argued that airport stops of suspected drug couri-
ers should fall within a limited exception to the probable cause
standard. Under this exception, the seizure of an individual is rea-
sonable if the officer has enough facts to support a "reasonable and
articulable suspicion."'71 The nature of the stop permitted under
this lower standard is quite different from a formal arrest based on
probable cause.
The "reasonable and articulable suspicion" standard
originated with Terry v. Ohio.72 In Terry, the Supreme Court of
the United States stated that it is the governmental interest in "ef-
fective crime prevention and detection ... which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest."' "7 If an officer can articulate
specific reasons that, based on his experience, reasonably cause
him to suspect an individual, he may effect an investigatory
"stop," a seizure less intrusive than an arrest.74 This stop permits
an officer to approach an individual, request identification, and ask
questions. If the information elicited allays the officer's suspicion,
no further detention is warranted. If, however, the investigation
confirms the officer's initial suspicion of criminal activity, probable
cause exists to arrest and thoroughly search the individual.75
Proponents of drug courier profiles argue that in airport nar-
cotics cases, government agents may stop suspects whose behavior
conforms to the supposed stereotype. In United States v. Menden-
hall,7 for example, the defendant had manifested the following
70. United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d at 389.
71. "[Any curtailment of a person's liberty by the police must be supported at least by
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activ-
ity." Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam).
72. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
73. Id. at 22.
74. Id. at 26; accord Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 536 n.13 (5th Cir.
1980).
75. A Terry investigatory stop only permits an officer to search a person whom the
officer suspects is carrying a weapon. Even then, the search is limited to a cursory search of
the outer clothing. 392 U.S. at 30. Because of the security measures taken by airports, drug
couriers seldom carry weapons. Kadish & Brofman, supra note 6, at 49.
76. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
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profile characteristics: travel from a major narcotics source city
(Los Angeles) to a narcotics distribution city (Detroit), nervous-
ness, deplaning last, scanning the entire terminal area in an appar-
ent effort to spot narcotics agents, failing to claim luggage, and
changing airlines for her departure from Detroit.7" Justice Powell
and two other Justices found that the government agents pos-
sessed reasonable and articulable suspicion when they seized Men-
denhall in the airport terminal.78 The four dissenting Justices,
however, thought that the officers' suspicions did not justify the
stop.79 One month later in Reid v. Georgia,0 a per curiam opinion,
the Court held that similar profile characteristics"' were not suffi-
cient to form an articulable suspicion.82
Advocates of the drug courier profile emphasize, as did Justice
Powell, that the public's compelling interest in detecting drug traf-
fickers justifies using the profile to provide articulable suspicion for
an investigative stop. s In Royer v. State,4 Judge Hubbart of the
Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District, agreed: "The
gravity of the governmental interest in suppressing the drug traffic
is, therefore, considerable, and that interest is surely served by the
temporary seizure of air travelers at the Miami International Air-
port for further investigation."88
77. Id. at 547 n.1.
78. Id. at 565 (concurring opinion). Although he had argued that Mendenhall's con-
formance to the profile characteristics was sufficient to establish articulable suspicion, Jus-
tice Powell also stated that "reliance upon the 'drug courier profile' [would not] necessarily
demonstrate reasonable suspicion. Each case raising a Fourth Amendment issue must be
judged on its own facts." Id. at 565 n.6.
79. Id. at 572-73 (White, J., dissenting).
80. 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
81. The defendant's profile characteristics in Reid were: 1) travel from a narcotics
source city (Fort Lauderdale) to a narcotics distribution city (Atlanta); 2) an early morning
arrival; 3) separation from a traveling companion; and 4) the absence of any luggage other
than shoulder bags. Id. at 440-41.
82. Id. at 441. Lower federal appellate courts interpreting the Reid decision have found
that although Reid "constitutes the .Court's first authoritative holding with respect to the
quantum of information necessary to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in
the context of the 'drug courier profile,'" United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1217
(5th Cir. 1980), and "[a]lthough not a complete rejection of the drug courier profile, the
Supreme Court's opinion implicitly admonishes the lower courts to consider carefully cases
decided on the basis of the drug courier profile, ascribing little weight to characteristics that
describe large numbers of innocent travelers." United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1081
(5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 649 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 565 (concurring opinion); accord United States v. Fry, 622
F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Grant, 392 So. 2d 1362, 1365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
84. 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehearing en banc), reveiw denied, 397
So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1981).
85. Id. at 1024 (concurring opinion).
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Judicial preoccupation with a major societal problem should
not, however, displace traditional fourth amendment analysis.
Courts should be reluctant to discard fundamental principles, such
as freedom from governmental intrusion, when society's concerns
are not clearly compelling. The courts have reacted to this concern
and the criticism directed at the profile.86 Federal and Florida ap-
pellate courts agree that a suspect's mere conformance to the pro-
file does not necessarily provide the reasonable and articulable sus-
picion needed for a valid Terry or investigative stop.8 7 As Judge
Fay pointed out in United States v. Pulvano,88
[W]e have very serious concern with the practice of routinely
stopping and questioning citizens traveling through airports on
wholly domestic flights. We are not unmindful of the DEA's dif-
ficult task of eliminating drug trafficking in this country, nor the
catastrophic results when they are unable to accomplish their
objective. Drug abuse poses a serious threat to some of the most
valuable assets of our society; namely our children and our fami-
lies. Nonetheless, there is an equally substantial interest in all
citizens in being free from unreasonable government intrusions
86. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
87. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980); United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d
1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3111 (1981); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979);
United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d
913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,
720 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Nembhard, 512 F. Supp. 15, 17 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015, 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehearing en banc), review
denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1981); State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d
593, 596 n.4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). But see United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir.
1980).
One or more suspicious, nonprofile characteristics or circumstances, in addition to con-
formance with the drug courier profile, can suffice to constitute the reasonable and articul-
able suspicion that justifies an investigative stop. See United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526
(5th Cir. 1980) (conformance plus evidence of planned escape); United States v. Vasquez-
Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1979) (conformance plus defendant and friend periodically
behaved like strangers), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); United States v. Andrews, 600
F.2d 563 (6th Cir.) (conformance plus anonymous tip), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 878 (1979);
United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672 (5th Cir.) (conformance plus bulge in defendant's
pant leg), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.
1979) (conformance plus agent's prior knowledge that defendent was a suspected heroin
dealer), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979)
(conformance plus hasty departure from airport); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th
Cir. 1978) (conformance plus abdominal bulge); United States v. Canales, 572 F.2d 1182 (6th
Cir. 1978) (conformance plus prior police surveillance indicating that defendant had made
heroin connection); State v. Mitchell, 377 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (conformance plus
reliable informant's tip, and known drug trafficker had driven defendant to airport).
88. 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980).
1981] DRUG COURIER PROFILES 105
in their daily lives. It is one of the basic tenets on which this
nation was founded and through which we have grown into the
world's guiding beacon for the principles of freedom and
democracy.
. . . It is the potential for infringing the rights of these citi-
zens that causes us to question the propriety of interrogating
individuals on the basis of a drug courier profile."
3. If the suspect consents to a search, is that consent voluntary?
After stopping a suspected drug courier, an officer ordinarily
tries to confirm his suspicions by searching the suspect's luggage
for contraband. The Supreme Court of the United States has held,
in at least two cases, that the fourth amendment does not permit
the officer to search the luggage without a warrant issued on the
basis of his reasonable belief that the luggage contains illegal
drugs.90 Because the officer may not be able to detain the suspect
long enough to procure a search warrant, the officer will typically
rely on an established and well-defined exception to the warrant
requirement: the suspect's consent to be searched.9 1
The Supreme Court held in Schneckloth v. Bustarnonte" that
valid consent requires "voluntariness."s The extensive case law
concerning voluntary confessions has aided courts in defining vol-
untariness in fourth amendment consent to search cases. 4 The de-
cisions balance the need for police questioning as an effective law
enforcement technique against society's belief that the police must
use the technique fairly. Although there is "no talismanic defini-
tion of 'voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the host of situa-
tions where the question has arisen,"9s a careful scrutiny of the
surrounding circumstances will determine whether the suspect vol-
untarily consented to the search."
The "totality of the circumstances" test is applied in search
and seizure cases to determine whether the consent was given
freely, or was the product of explicit or implicit coercion or du-
89. Id. at 1155 n.1.
90. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977).
91. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 248. The Court explicitly refused to apply the "knowing and intelligent
waiver" standard to consent cases. Id. at 246.
94. Id. at 223-24.
95. Id. at 224.
96. Id. at 248.
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ress.97 If the consent to search was involuntary, "any search based
solely upon such consent will be deemed void under the fourth
amendment. Because illegally obtained evidence may not be ad-
missible at trial, the validity of the consent will many times deter-
mine the viability of the subsequent prosecution."" s
The analysis of the surrounding circumstances must include
the "possibly vulnerable subjective state" of the suspect who au-
thorizes the search. 9 The suspect should be "plainly capable of a
knowing consent."' 100 Factors such as education, intelligence, and
the officer's failure to advise the suspect of his rights are impor-
tant.101 The government must also clearly show that the individual
freely permitted or expressly invited the search. 10 2 Mere submis-
sion or acquiescence to authority is never sufficient to establish
voluntariness; rather it suggests coercion. 03 "Where there is coer-
cion there cannot be consent.' 0 4 The Schneckloth Court cautioned
that "no matter how subtly the coercion was applied, the resulting
'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police
intrusion against which the Fourth Amendment is directed." 0 5
Determining the voluntariness of a suspect's consent to the
search given after he has been validly seized typically poses few
difficulties in 'the airport narcotics stop and search cases. Federal
and Florida courts have consistently upheld consents if the
seizures were based on probable cause or articulable suspicion. 06
97. Id. at 227.
98. Comment, Governmental Deception in Consent Searches, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 57,
60 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
99. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
100. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558 (1980).
101. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
102. United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161, 1167 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3111 (1981); United States v.
Black, 510 F. Supp. 989, 993 (N.D. Ill. 1981); United States v. Nembhard, 512 F. Supp. 15,
19 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 27-28 (Fla. 1975); Taylor v. State, 355
So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1978); Mobley v. State, 335
So. 2d 880, 882-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1977).
103. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 576 (White, J., dissenting); Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 858
(6th Cir. 1981); State v. Lanxon, 393 So. 2d 1194, 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Robinson v.
State, 388 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
104. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
105. 412 U.S. at 228.
106. See United States v. Williams, 647 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 649 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S, Ct. 3111 (1981); United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2325 (1981);
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The difficulty arises when the courts find that the officer did not
have grounds for seizing the suspect. Although not conclusive, the
illegal seizure of the suspected drug courier is a factor weighted
heavily in determinations of voluntariness. Consequently, the gov-
ernment's showing of voluntariness must meet a higher degree of
proof if the suspect's consent to the search follows an invalid
seizure. 
10 7
Because the suspected drug couriers usually cannot ascertain
whether the stop or arrest is illegal, most suspects naturally as-
sume that they must submit to the authority of the officers.'
Courts consider consent under these circumstances to be indicative
of mere acquiescence to the illegal assertion of authority, unless
the government offers strong evidence to the contrary. 10 9 There-
fore, an illegal arrest raises a presumption of involuntariness. 10
"[A]ny serious illegal actioifs by a law enforcement officer, such as
an illegal arrest, almost always render involuntary any subsequent
consent to search given by the victim of the illegal action.""'
If the police subject the suspected drug courier to an illegal
investigatory detention, the issue of voluntariness is less clear-
United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d
1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 907 (1980); United States v. Vasquez-Santiago,
602 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); United States v. Price, 599
F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v.
Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Canales, 572 F.2d 1182 (6th Cir. 1978);
State v. Grant, 392 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Mitchell, 377 So. 2d 1006 (Fla.
3d DCA 1979); Myles v. State, 374 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Case Comment, Fourth
Amendment-Airport Searches and Seizures: Where Will the Court Land?, 71 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 499 (1980).
107. United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 858 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 606 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 721 (6th Cir. 1977); cf United
States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962) (burden greater if defendant has been
arrested).
108. Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 28 (Fla. 1975).
109. There may be a few rare instances in which a valid consent could be made
after an illegal arrest, provided that circumstances were so strong, clear and con-
vincing as to remove any doubt of a truly voluntary waiver. However, ordinarily
consent given after an illegal arrest will not lose its unconstitutional taint.
Id. at 27-28; see Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015, 1019-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehear-
ing en banc), review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1981). In
Royer, the defendant was confined in a small interrogation room after the initial investiga-
tory stop. The court viewed this as tantamount to an arrest. Id. at 1018.
110. Norman v. State, 379 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (Fla. 1980); Robinson v. State, 388 So. 2d
286, 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
111. Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 835
(Fla. 1978).
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cut 12 because investigatory stops involve less coercion, detention,
and intimidation than an arrest.113 Federal and Florida courts have
considered evidence that the police warned the suspect of his right
to refuse to consent as a highly significant factor in the determina-
tion of voluntariness. " Other factors have been minimized as a
result.
4. If the suspect is illegally seized, but voluntarily consents to a
luggage search, is the contraband seized nevertheless "fruit of the
poisonous tree" that must be excluded at trial?
The analysis of airport narcotics searches does not end with a
judicial determination that a suspected drug courier voluntarily
consented to the search after an illegal detention. As the court in
United States v. Robinson'" pointed out, the suspect's voluntary
consent does not automatically remove the taint of an illegal
seizure. "[V]oluntariness is merely a threshold requirement. The
'causal connection' between the illegal seizure and the consent to
search must be independently examined. . . in light of the policies
to be served by the fourth amendment exclusionary rule.""' The
rule is calculated to deter unlawful police conduct and preserve ju-
112. Factors tending to indicate involuntariness include detaining the suspect in unfa-
miliar surroundings; the presence of several government agents; telling the suspect that he
must either consent to the search or continue to be detained until the agents can obtain a
search warrant; and the absence of explicit oral or written consent. Factors indicative of
voluntariness are average education and intelligence, and no .period of prolonged question-
ing. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 721 (6th Cir. 1977). Compare State v. Lanxon,
393 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (despite notification of right to refuse consent, officer's
statements accusing defendant of transporting narcotics, coupled with threat that trained
dog would sniff her luggage at her destination, were sufficiently coercive to negate consent)
with State v. Parsons, 389 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (warnings and written waiver
sufficient to make consent voluntary, despite being told that warrant would be sought if
consent form was not signed).
113. See United States v. Moeller, 644 F.2d 518, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
669 (1981); United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 898 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berd,
634 F.2d 979, 984-85 (5th Cir. 1981); see also supra text accompanying notes 73-75.
114. See United States v. Pulvano, 629 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.
1980); United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1979). But see United States v.
McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). One court found that because the defendant did not
receive a warning, his consent was probably involuntary. United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d
913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978). In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 (1973), however,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that proof of an individual's knowledge of his
right to refuse to consent is not an indispensable prerequisite to voluntariness. Rather, a
fourth amendment warning is merely one of several factors weighed. Id.
115. 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980).
116. Id. at 1220; see United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1081 n.10 (5th Cir.) (ap-
proval of Robinson analysis), reh'g granted, 649 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1981).
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dicial integrity by prohibiting the admission of evidence obtained
illegally. 117
In Wong Sun v. United States, 18 the Supreme Court assessed
the admissibility of oral statements that the defendant had made
as a result of the unlawful conduct of federal narcotics agents. The
Court held that the statements were "the 'fruit' of official illegal-
ity," and had to be excluded at trial.1 9 The test was "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation
of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint."' 20 Evidence acquired during an
"unlawful invasion" must be freely given to purge "the primary
taint."''
Wong Sun failed to establish definite standards for determin-
ing when a consent is sufficiently voluntary to prevent the applic-
tion of the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court confronted the
issue in Brown v. Illinois.122 The case involved a murder suspect
who had been arrested and subsequently interrogated at the police
station. The suspect confessed to his role in the crime after the
police advised him of his Miranda1'3 rights."" Although the Illinois
state courts conceded that the police had arrested Brown without
probable cause,125 the courts adopted and applied a per se rule that
the Miranda warnings broke the causal connection between the il-
legal arrest and the evidence produced.26
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding
that although the administration of Miranda warnings may have
made the subsequent confession voluntary,
the Fourth Amendment issue remains. In order for the causal
chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subse-
quent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that
the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntari-
ness but that it be "sufficiently an act of free will to purge the
117. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 222 (1960); see Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
118. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
119. Id. at 485.
120. Id. at 488 (quoting J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT § 5.07, at 221 (1959)).
121. 371 U.S. at 486.
122. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
124. 422 U.S. at 594.
125. Id. at 596.
126. Id. at 597, 603.
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primary taint."'2 7
The Court articulated a four-factor test in determining whether
Brown's consent to the questioning broke the causal connection
with his unlawful arrest:
The question whether a confession is the product of a free will
under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No
single fact is dispositive .... The Miranda warnings are an im-
portant factor .... But they are not the only factor to be con-
sidered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confes-
sion, the presence of intervening circumstances, . . . and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct
are all relevant.
28
Applying this four-factor analysis, the Court specifically held
that the Miranda warnings did not suffice to purge the taint of
Brown's prior illegal seizure. 12 The Court concluded that the lapse
of less than two hours between Brown's arrest and confession was
not enough to justify ignoring the initial illegality.130 The Court
also stated that "there was no intervening event of significance
whatsoever,"' 1 thereby implicitly rejecting Miranda warnings as
an intervening circumstance. Finally, the Court stressed the
flagrancy of the officers' midconduct: Brown had been arrested "in
the hope that something might turn up.'
'3 2
The basis of the Court's holding that Miranda warnings do
not purge the taint of an illegal seizure was revealed only indirectly
in the opinion. "Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confes-
sion made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth
Amendment violation."3 3 In a footnote to this statement, the
Court added, "The Miranda warnings in no way inform a person of
his Fourth Amendment rights . ..- ;134 rather, the warnings are di-
rected to fifth amendment interests. 3 5 This raises the important
question Whether a fourth amendment warning, specifically advis-
ing a suspect of his right to refuse a search, renders an ensuing
consent sufficiently voluntary to purge the taint of an illegal
127. Id. at 601-02 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)).
128. 422 U.S. at 603-04 (footnotes and citation omitted).
129. Id. at 605.
130. Id. at 604-05.
131. Id. at 604.
132. Id. at 605.
133. Id. at 601 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 601 n.6.




In cases involving suspected drug couriers, defendants have
frequently argued that an illegal seizure taints any subsequent con-
sensual search even if a fourth amendment warning was given.
Therefore, the "fruit" of the search should be subject to the exclu-
sionary rule. Most courts have rejected this argument.' 6 This de-
velopment poses serious questions respecting the continued effi-
cacy of fourth amendment guarantees. The significance that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit attaches to
warnings is illustrative. In Bretti v. Wainwright,'7 the court
viewed a specific fourth amendment warning as another factor to
consider in determining whether a consent was valid: "While warn-
ings prior to a consensual search may not have the same indispens-
ability as those required prior to a confession, . . . they do help
ensure that the consent is free, voluntary, and untainted by the
arrest's possible illegality.' ' 88 Later cases, such as United States v.
Williams'3 9 and United States v. Fike,"0 suggest that the Fifth
Circuit is adopting sub silentio a rule that the administration of
fourth amendment warnings renders consensual searches suffi-
ciently voluntary to dissipate the taint of an antecendent illegal
seizure.'
These decisions cannot be reconciled with the analysis in
Brown v. Illinois."2 First, the "temporal proximity" of the illegal
search and consent in the drug courier cases is usually a matter of
minutes-well under the two-hour span that was considered too
short in Brown."13 Second, a major purpose of the exclusionary rule
136. United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Howard, 394 So.
2d 440 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Husted v. State, 370 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); St. John v.
State, 363 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); see United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916
(5th Cir. 1978); Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1015, 1019-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (rehear-
ing en banc), review denied, 397 So. 2d 779 (Fla.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 631 (1981).
137. 439 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971).
138. Id. at 1046 (citations omitted); accord Husted v. State, 370 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979) ("[S]uch a warning breaks the connection with any prior illegal police activity so
as to render a subsequent consent un-'tainted,' uncoerced, and truly voluntary in
character.").
139. 647 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1981). Williams and two other recent Fifth Circuit cases,
United States v. Herbst, 641 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1981) and United States v. Turner, 628
F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2325 (1981), indicate that DEA agents
recite from cards similar to those used to advise suspects of their Miranda rights.
140. 449 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1971).
141. Williams, 647 F.2d at 591; Fike, 449 F.2d at 194.
142. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
143. Id. at 604. But cf. Sizemore v. State, 390 So. 2d 401, 404-05 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
(even though suspect was seized illegally, fourth amendment warnings and elapse of thirty
1981]
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is to deter unlawful police conduct."' If the "fruit" of illegal
seizures were admissible, narcotics agents would seldom be de-
terred from randomly and illegally stopping nervous airline passen-
gers waiting to depart from Miami International Airport." 5 As the
Supreme Court stated in Davis v. Mississippi,' "[t]he exclusion-
ary rule was fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter over-
reaching governmental conduct prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment.'
' 4 7
The Court's opinion in Brown stated that "[tlhe question
whether [the 'fruits' of official misconduct are] the product of a
free will . . . must be answered on the facts of each case. No single
fact is dispositive.'" 8 In contrast, many federal and Florida courts
have attached too much significance to the administration of a
fourth amendment warning. As the Supreme Court noted critically
in Dunaway v. New York, ' 4 "[t]his betrays a lingering confusion
between 'voluntariness' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and
the 'causal connection' test established in Brown."" 0 Recognizing
this confusion, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Robinson"'
found that a suspected drug courier's acquiescence to a search was
voluntary. 52 The agents' request was polite and accompanied by
an effective warning. " " Nevertheless, the court remanded the case
for a determination of whether the connection between the illegal
stop and the consensual search was sufficiently attenuated to deny
the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. 54 If fourth
amendment warnings alone were sufficient to purge the taint of il-
legal seizures, "[a]ny incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment viola-
tions would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a
'cure-all,' and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful
searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to 'a form of
words.' "155
minutes rendered consent valid), review denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1981).
144. See supra text accompanying note 117.
145. See United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1080 n.8 (5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 649
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1981).
146. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
147. Id. at 724.
148. 422 U.S. at 603.
149. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
150. Id. at 219; accord United States v. Robinson, 625 F.2d 1211, 1220 (5th Cir. 1980).
151. 625 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1980).
152. Id. at 1218.
153. Id. at 1219.
154. Id. at 1220.




The transportation of narcotics has become a critical problem
nationally, as well as in Florida. To combat this problem, the DEA
and local police agencies have initiated programs to apprehend
suspected drug couriers at airports. The seizures and searches raise
a number of constitutional issues: 1) the initial police-citizen en-
counter may constitute a fourth amendment seizure; 2) the seizure
may not be constitutionally justified; 3) the suspect's subsequent
consent to a luggage search may not be voluntary; and 4) the in-
criminating evidence obtained as a result of the seizure may be
"fruit of the poisonous tree," and, consequently, excluded at trial
despite the suspect's voluntary consent.
The seriousness of the problem of drug trafficking has caused
some courts to bend traditional fourth amendment principles. But,
as one judge stressed, "[t]here is no separate body of Fourth
Amendment law applicable to domestic airport stops by the
DEA."'"6 The Supreme Court of the United States cautioned
nearly a century ago in Boyd v. United States:57
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional pro-
visions for the security of person and property should be liber-
ally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of
half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty
of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citi-
zen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
In short, the magnitude of the drug trafficking problem cannot
be permitted to overwhelm the constitutional rights involved. Al-
ternative means should be found to combat the distribution of
narcotics. 159
(1961)).
156. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1344 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 907 (1980).
157. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
158. Id. at 635.
159. A related line of cases involving "dog sniff alerts" suggests one possible alternative.
In such cases, airport narcotics agents who suspect someone because he fits the drug courier
profile will locate that person's luggage in the baggage room. The agents then use a highly
trained canine to sniff the suitcase in a luggage lineup before the individual claims it. The
dog will assume a "positive alert" position if it detects certain kinds of contraband in the
19811
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suitcase.
Courts have consistently held that a dog sniff does not constitute a fourth amendment
search. Furthermore, a positive reaction from the dog can constitute probable cause both to
arrest the individual who subsequently claims the luggage and to procure a warrant for a
search of the luggage following the arrest. United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3111 (1981); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 (1976);
United States v. Fulero, 498 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Ricano, 393 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.
3d DCA 1981); State v. Mosier, 392 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Bouler v. State, 389 So.
2d 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Harpold v. State, 389 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review
denied, 397 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1981); see Sizemore v. State, 390 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980),
review denied, 399 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1981); Mata v. State, 380 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 3d DCA),
review denied, 389 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1980).
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